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Abstract
Computational readings of culture allow us to pose new questions or create 
new cultural forms supporting new forms of critical thinking and reading. Yet 
the machine may not be able to identify some of the qualities, such as emo-
tion, that might be central to the question raised. Using the Next Rembrandt 
project as a case study, this paper suggests an approach to consider the 
medium as the site of meaning making in digital culture and how this affects 
critical practice using Raymond Williams, David Berry and Jacques Derrida. 
In the first part, I consider the idea of reading with machines and how this 
might be considered within the medium. The second part uses iteracy to find 
meaning in the models and how this might reveal new critical paths through 
readings of the image. The final part presents a reading of the digital object 
itself and how these can be used to create a space for meaning to come into 
being. Through this, the article raises questions about critical techniques 
for understanding the material object in distant reading methodologies as 
ongoing research.
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Computational readings of culture allow us 
to pose new questions or create new cul-
tural forms supporting new forms of critical 
thinking and reading. Yet the machine may 
not be able to identify some of the qualities, 
such as emotion, that might be central to the 
question raised. The advantages of distant 
reading, such as scale, may be tempered by 
a realisation of what may be missing. 
Using the Next Rembrandt project as a 
case study, the aim of this paper is to sug-
gest an approach to consider the medium as 
the site of meaning making in digital culture 
and how this affects critical practice. In the 
first part, I consider the idea of reading with 
machines and how this might be considered 
within the medium. The second part uses 
David Berry’s iteracy to find meaning in the 
models and how this might reveal new criti-
cal paths. The third part presents a reading 
of the digital object itself and how these can 
be used to create a space for meaning to 
come into being.
Raymond Williams’s structures of feel-
ing suggest a way of beginning to think about 
this new understanding. I build on this con-
ception that “a cultural hypothesis, actually 
derived from attempts to understand such 
elements and their connections in a genera-
tion or period, and needing always to be re-
turned, interactively, to such evidence”(133) 
by situating the elements and connections 
within a digital reading. Computational read-
ing derives features from the data based 
on human thought and interpretation of the 
hypothesis, either in the construction of 
algorithms or labelling of data. Once identi-
fied, the features may then be analysed 
or combined to create new structures and 
elements. Qualitative feelings such as emo-
tions become uncertain elements that the 
quantitative seeks to understand through 
models. I will suggest that a critical reading 
of the digital object reveals ways in which the 
human might be understood and to suggest 
a critical practice. 
This suggests two critical responses 
that I will explore in this paper. The considera-
tion of structures of feeling requires not only 
human reading but also technical reading 
itself using models to understand the digital. 
Reflecting on Hayles’s sense that print is 
shallow but code is deep, I suggest that this 
develops cyborg reading, where the “reader 
necessarily is constructed as a cyborg, 
spliced into an integrated circuit with one or 
more intelligent machines” (85), a technique 
to interpret the medium’s discourse. I want 
to develop this through the way that reading 
digital culture means reading with machines 
to understand the data. 
I want to develop this reading as an 
experimental process as well as consider-
ing the materiality of computational culture. 
Berry’s iteracy, “the ability to read, write and 
understand processes” (190), is a key to un-
derstanding the artefact and to interact with 
its relocation of epistemology. This uses both 
cultural hypotheses and evidence to test how 
the data is being created, so placing a hu-
man meaning into the process. Building on 
Berry and Fagerjord’s call that “culture […] 
is materialised and fixed in forms specific to 
material digital culture”,(142) I want to think 
about how the presentation of the final form 
reveals and hides the metamedium nature 
of the digital, capable of transforming exist-
ing media and creating new media and 
technologies.
Next Rembrandt
In this section, I want to consider the Next 
Rembrandt[1] and to think about how it is 
read with machines. The project was an ex-
periment to create a new picture from a read-
ing of Rembrandt’s portraits, shown in Figure 
1. The Next Rembrandt is an algorithmically 
generated image by a partnership of J. Walter 
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Thompson Amsterdam, ING, Microsoft, 
TU Delft and the Mauritshuis. Using high 
resolution 3-dimensional scans and digital 
versions of 346 of Rembrandt’s portraits, 
machine learning algorithms identified the 
key points to be created from 150 Gigabytes 
of generated graphics. Using a mix of cloud 
and physical machines, the algorithms were 
tested and run in parallel. The rendering of 
the portrait took 500 hours on machines and 
a 3-dimensional printed picture is created 
from 148 million pixels. The computational 
aspects both hide themselves behind and 
are bound into the impression of paint. 
This impression is an imitation made up 
from a digital reading of the drops of paint 
and the intentional layering to be recreated 
in 3-dimensions for the physical portrait. The 
created form echoes an earlier tradition to 
present itself as a singular object. A closer 
reading suggests that Finn’s assertion that 
“code can be magical” (5), where the code is 
an agent in changing the world and the mind, 
is at play here. The layered paint sections hint 
at algorithms used to create them as does 
the gaze in both editions of the painting. The 
attempts at authenticity in both digital forms 
provoke a desire to read it more closely, to 
understand the entwined cultures, but the 
machine resists traditional cultural readings 
to fully tease apart the layers. Authenticity 
becomes inauthentic, unless it is read with a 
machine or a machine in mind.
As a digital object, a machine is re-
quired to read and render the cultural data 
through new models of space, location, 
and artistic models to make it visible to the 
human. Culture needs to be read through 
computational remediation. Yet the work 
appears to capture human aspects, such 
as emotion. Emotional reactions may have 
alternative meanings in the technical world. 
They may be seen as signs of both com-
mercial and personal engagement or a data 
point in a model to suggest new content or 
to try to refine models of how to understand 
humans. Even these emotional points can be 
limited to a recognised and constrained set 
of emotions. We need to consider the con-
texts they exist in. Emotional markers may 
be read through sentiment analysis or from 
a reaction on a page by a machine looking 
for engagement or a commercial opportunity. 
Or is it learning how to recreate our reality 
through a numeric system? 
Reading with machines
We need to read with machines to begin 
accessing this culture and understanding its 
new forms. 
The visual layer invites a human read-
ing of the image and to infer the emotional 
states represented in the eyes and the wistful 
mouth. Within the given boundaries, the al-
gorithms create an image using an intensely 
close reading of colour palettes and shades 
but can only imitate emotion. A reading of the 
object as a visualisation provokes questions 
about how the representation is considered, 
either as a close reading of the portraits so 
enhancing a trait that it reads or whether the 
algorithm has created it? 
Having considered using machines 
to generate and process the data, I want 
to think about how we might begin to think 
with the machine and considering how they 
might generate knowledge. At the very least, 
Figure 1: Image of the Next Rembrandt. Photo: J. 
Walter Thompson Amsterdam.
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we must admit that we need to read with the 
machine. Born digital culture, like the Next 
Rembrandt, cannot be read by a human; it 
requires computational remediation. Such art 
alters our critical relationship with machines 
and raising a crucial role for questioning the 
medium itself as site of cognitive practice 
through remediation. 
Using a machine to write data suggests 
that it is required to read and remediate it, so 
using it as part of the interpretation through 
the models encoded into the process. It may 
be mediated through visualisation or sonifica-
tion processes, providing another area that 
needs to be understood. Instead of reading 
data, we read presentation models that af-
fect hypothetical models as a strategy of not 
reading (Clement; Moretti, “Conjectures in 
World Literature”). This practice accepts that 
the quantity of information cannot be read 
at a close level, by humans but that broad 
patterns can be viewed through machines. 
In cultural terms, this builds on Moretti’s 
concept that “distance is not an obstacle, 
but a specific form of knowledge: fewer 
elements, hence a sharper sense of their 
overall interconnection” (Moretti, Graphs, 
Maps, Trees 1). These abstractions, allowing 
the reading of patterns over specificities, are 
digital structures used to support interpreta-
tion or remediation. Machine interpretation 
may also be fuzzy and not show outliers or 
emerging patterns if they are too slow and 
long, suggesting that the subtleties of emo-
tion may be aggregated through counts into 
clusters of readings at the machine level. 
Although brought together as one im-
age, the picture is a series of algorithmic 
observations. Each of these is a specific 
form of knowledge gained through the distant 
reading and pieced together through other 
forms of knowledge. The machine, through 
its learning algorithms, uses a hypothesis 
to test its understanding and creates an im-
age. Its understanding of a structure is taken 
from the evidence, to which the evidence 
is returned once the process has tested it. 
I would suggest that this understanding is 
based in computational materiality. 
The project is a close reading of por-
traits conducted by machines to create a 
machine-readable data set. The algorithms 
identify relevant parts of information. The 
resulting image requires computational re-
mediation to convert the numeric world into a 
human readable one. In a very real fashion, 
we can only read the image with a machine. 
This echoes Adorno and Horkheimer’s cul-
ture industry that broadcasts and replicates 
itself, where we rely on technology to create 
and remediate culture. 
Reading with machines
We begin to read with machines and to un-
derstand how both sides form and contribute 
to digital culture.  
By this, I mean that we need to consider 
not only the interface and how that creates a 
reality but how we can use any given options 
or even access to the algorithms to consider 
the logics at play. Reflecting on the roots of 
iteracy as iteration, I want to think about how 
it can be used to repeat a process, perhaps 
with alterations, to allow the algorithm to 
be the point of interaction. Through making 
changes, user meaning can be given to the 
machine to continue hypothesis testing. 
When Next Rembrandt was being created, 
algorithms were repeatedly run in parallel. 
The repetition of these processes provides 
a space for the human thought to enter the 
process and realise the potential of Ramsay’s 
algorithmic criticism (33) to reconceive both 
the form and criticism’s logics in a playful 
form. Tweaking the parameters and repeat-
ing the process not only reveals the process 
through which the picture is made but also 
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allows humans into the iterative loop and 
realise the hypothetical nature of the work 
through experimentation. This site of interac-
tion moves human cognition into the machine 
so as to embed the concept of thinking with 
the machine and its models. 
The materiality of computation be-
comes more apparent through these acts. 
Researchers defined that the resulting 
person was Caucasian, male, wearing black 
clothes with a white collar and between thirty 
and forty. This suggests a machine logic 
that might recognise the image but requires 
guidance through wider cultural nuance that 
might be either difficult to model or statistically 
insignificant. This is translated into a model 
or set of constraints. The limitations of the 
machine’s cultural understanding become 
more visible as does the imposition of human 
values into the reconstruction algorithms. 
Taking an active stance in considering how 
the computational both reads and writes the 
data reveals not only different meanings but 
suggests new critical practice.
Using machines raises questions about 
culture. Are new cultural forms appearing: 
ones that can be appreciated by both ma-
chines and humans? What forms of culture 
may arise from this? Who owns the created 
form? Is a new culture industry being created 
through the use of social media or infrastruc-
ture companies to create cultural forms? 
I want to take a brief pause to consider 
the critical theoretical response to this posi-
tion. At one remove, the process of creating 
the model of the image reduces the human 
to a set of constructs, such as average width 
between the eyes, which is then broadcast 
to the viewer. The digital can reproduce the 
image in a variety of forms from the same 
underlying data and the results of the im-
perfect structures are encoded in this view. 
Benjamin’s assertion that “reproduction de-
taches the reproduced object from the domain 
of tradition” (215) can be operationalised to 
interrogate the structure in its new tradition. 
The newly created digital reading raises 
questions as to which tradition is being de-
veloped. The artist becomes the subject of 
the work rather than the creator, though he is 
elided from the public gaze. As well as read-
ing and showing the new structures of feeling, 
the object itself is not part of Rembrandt’s tra-
dition. Aside from the ownership questions, 
the newly created picture exists within an 
alternate context. Material questions about 
whether it can be considered as a work of 
new media art or data visualisation and what 
its relation to Rembrandt’s oeuvre might be? 
Is it a creation or an analytical work? Digital 
reading of the portraits detaches this from the 
paintings and creates a new tradition through 
algorithms and processing power. 
Infrastructural questions can be raised. 
One project partner, ING, fund cultural insti-
tutions, such as the Rijksmuseum, enabling 
cultural institutions to remain open. However, 
it might also be read as patronage. A culture 
industry arising from the financial ability to 
support human endeavour and the physical 
infrastructure. JWT Amsterdam also paid for 
the physical version of the painting to be cre-
ated. This provokes further questions about 
the relationship between digital and physical 
artistic culture. The digital has the potential 
for writing, assuming the protected mode is 
off. An act of execution and change, writing 
is a permissioned act within computation. 
The machine owners may grant or deny the 
permission for non-owners to write any data 
without a visible infrastructure. As such, the 
culture shown is one where the non-corporate 
entity is deemed lower and granted read only 
permissions. 
Patronage can be rethought through 
the computational. The scale of the data pro-
duced by the project as well as the amount 
of processing power needed to run the facial 
recognition and rendering processes on 
such a large digital object suggests that new 
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platforms are required. The infrastructure is 
provided by Microsoft in this instance. Both 
of these require financial and computational 
power so renewing patronage as a computa-
tional form. This embeds such providers into 
the warp and weft of digital culture. Without a 
return to reading with machines and consid-
ering their logics, we return to a transmit only 
culture. Technical specialisations create the 
conditions for a read only culture, so project-
ing their dominance into a cultural sphere. 
The rendered figure, through its created 
class and social standing, perhaps points to 
the role of the creative partners in creating 
the image.
The face is a construction of models 
and aggregations rather than being read and 
interpreted from a sitter. Critical questions 
remain about whether this project was a safe 
space to develop and use facial recognition 
and reconstruction algorithms. This project 
creates an ethical safe space to reflect on 
these algorithms within a known set of biases, 
ones defined in the underlying data set and 
the parameters given for the reconstruction. 
I want to raise these as critical issues to be 
able to interrogate the created image and the 
assumptions that give it focus. 
The born digital image is both remedi-
ated into a human readable image and ren-
dered as an artefact that I want to think of as 
reborn analogue. This latter form, the printed 
image, continues to challenge the concepts of 
tradition. Through being made into a physical 
object, it is placed into a museum setting that 
the funders support as well as what might 
be considered an old media cultural setting. 
The image is also available digitally and can 
be copied and reproduced. This latter tradi-
tion that is represented is one driven by the 
technological medium as something that can 
be easily shared at minimal effort. What the 
physical print elides is that it was printed from 
the digital file. Generated from the digital file, 
‘paint’ is calculated through machine learning 
and printed in minor layers. The computa-
tional re-presents the paint medium as an 
abstraction that requires a deep reading to 
understand the artifice of a natural process. 
Paint drops become composed rather than 
accidental. As well as remediating the data 
into new forms, new tools and conceptual 
processes are required to understand the 
materiality of the object and how these fits in 
with existing traditions. 
A consideration of the image involves its 
methods of creation. From here, we need to 
extend Hayles’s notion of thinking through the 
network to consider the physical machines, 
such as printers, and materials involved. 
The printed image was not only made on a 
3-dimensional printer but through layers of 
printing substrate, though both are controlled 
by the file made from the image. As well as 
encouraging us to read in different ways, we 
need to think about the techne itself and how 
this supports an epistemological reading. 
Iteracy’s root as literacy provokes ques-
tions of how one might read or listen to the 
results as abstractions and patterns. The 
act of interacting with the process embeds a 
human element in part of it, suggesting that 
the object being read comes from thinking 
through a network. Next Rembrandt may be 
read as an image but to understand it, one 
needs to consider new practices of reading 
and meaning making. In many aspects, 
this is a technically demanding reading. 
We might feel the sadness and warmth in 
the sitter’s eyes or the slightly worn look 
derived from the way the light plays on the 
features and through the layers of paint. I 
contend that we are inside an interpretational 
loop, reading the evidence supplied to us 
from a hypothetical model encoded into the 
process. The machine uses aggregations of 
the models and the data to create a new set 
of data points derived through a model. The 
underlying algorithms create a numerical 
reading, themselves bound within what the 
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limitations of the algorithms and the hard-
ware. Its surface is a visualisation, where 
mappings mediate the numerical data into a 
new point, which humans perceive as colour 
at a location. From a human perspective, we 
note the stylistic similarities, the attention to 
detail in the style and the emotion in the face. 
There is a disjunction here between the two 
readings that reveals the need for conceiving 
about how this can be critically approached. 
Read together, these data points begin to 
suggest the underlying logics, such as the 
position of light, as we move from a macro- to 
a microanalysis. With the assumption that we 
are unaware of the human provided limita-
tions, the reading can interrogate how the 
machine reads the data to project a model of 
its understanding.
I want to turn to models as an integral 
part of these computational structures. 
McCarty echoes Weizenbaum in consider-
ing computational systems as dependent on 
the models given to them to understand a 
conception of the world. The use of Artificial 
Intelligence to create data sets and models 
raises questions of who is the designer 
and whose world is being created? The 
model’s structure of an element rests on 
how the designer or implementer translates 
and transcodes the element into their work 
as well as the model’s purpose. The model 
itself requires critical consideration of what is 
being modelled and what is being presented 
through the computational. 
The use of the machine suggests that 
the computational materiality needs to be 
considered for what is being modelled and 
presented but how and the values that lie 
within the processes. Weizenbaum’s consid-
eration that the “symbolic recreation of [the 
designer’s] world” (18) may be read in two 
ways. Firstly, the model and its associated 
processes reflect their purpose and process. 
Secondly, the medium affects the object 
through its own limitations and understanding 
but it shows a need for a critical practice to 
determine where the model might come 
from and how it is represented. As the data 
is being rendered, the model’s values are 
being applied through the processes. The 
reconstructive stage shows the machine’s 
iteration as it mapped the facial features to 
proportions until it achieved the final image. 
Through testing the image, the algorithms 
are testing themselves. Using this, one might 
read the intention behind the models that are 
shown and to understand the two readings 
available – the numerical and the rendered – 
and to probe its limitations. 
A key point is Williams’s issue with the 
specifics of what constitutes an element in 
discourse is further problematised through 
translation and encoding required for the 
machine to understand them as hypothetical 
constructs. A new discourse is created from 
the results, which require reading when it has 
bene returned to the evidence from whence it 
came. The underlying computer model both 
makes and is made from the translation. 
This alters the location of epistemology from 
the reading and interpretation to within the 
computational. A necessary consequence 
is a potential change of the location of the 
element’s negotiation. 
Whilst it may happen as part of wider 
cultural discourse, it is happening within the 
algorithms and their models of the world. As 
discussed, human intervention can help to 
mould the uncertain elements into an appre-
ciable form through a combination generated 
from iterate readings. 
The digital object 
as pharmakon 
Having considered the image and its con-
sequences for realising the digital, I want 
to focus on the digital object itself. Having 
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discussed potential ways of making mean-
ing, I want to illuminate the material that 
reshapes both it- and ourselves as the site of 
cognitive practice. 
I see the pharmakon acting as dis-
course. Derived from Plato’s view that writing 
“will make them remember things by relying 
on marks made by others, from outside 
themselves, not on their inner resources” 
(69), Derrida suggests that it “acts as both 
remedy and poison” (Derrida, Dissemination 
73) and injects itself into discourse. At one 
level, text provides a discourse that can be 
read and shared, yet it also removes the 
ability to query the underlying discourse and 
remakes it in its own symbols. This imitation 
of practices suggests that there is a compu-
tational cognitive economy where only those 
who can create the tools to understand the 
digital object may interpret it. I suggest that 
by exposing the pharmakon, one can bring 
different tools to understand it. This sug-
gests an alteration how we think the digital 
affects writing. Where Plato’s writing loses 
both access to memory and the underlying 
discourse, the object is central to both as the 
locus between humans and machine cogni-
tive practices. It both creates and transforms 
the cultural forms, acting as memory and 
discourse to express them. 
The Next Rembrandt image is a medi-
cine in its form. Without reflection of its mate-
riality, hidden by the (in)authentic surface, it is 
a poison. Where the textual medium removes 
access to an oral discourse through remedia-
tion, the digital can be remediated into dif-
ferent media though the original language is 
computational. It can be accessed using tools 
and with permissions. Understanding that 
the digital can be presented in different ways, 
such as a born digital or a printed picture, 
creates the space for a critical gap to appear. 
Even using machines and programming lan-
guages, one has to acknowledge the trans-
lations and transcoding to converse across 
the layers. Taking Manovich’s conception of 
the metamedium (101-102), critical practice 
becomes a tool of and about the medium. 
This practice, as shown above, does not 
necessarily need to use computational tools 
to be reflexive but can also be theoretical 
by bringing the object into a different being. 
Having suggested that the digital object is 
a pharmakon, I want to extend the reading 
through Derrida’s différance and the use of 
play that it reveals. 
As human and machine discourses mix, 
they reconstruct their own context into new 
discourse. The ontotheological message of 
a machine reading data becomes one with 
the potential for multiple meanings. As the 
model is read and processed as “a sort of 
writing” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 56), its 
form is recontextualised, moving from an im-
age through numerical models to become its 
own grammatology. Realising that the object 
is made up of these changes recognises the 
différance, the gap created between the signi-
fier and the signified when the computational 
elides itself. Although based on a learned 
aggregate set of elements, like the colouring 
and the geometries involved, a human read-
ing may infer emotion into Next Rembrandt’s 
eyes or face and realises a human part of the 
language. Where machine process may be 
limited in their qualitative meaning making, 
human readers may recognise the possibili-
ties of the elements that exist as a series of 
interpretative gaps that expose the potential 
for new critical readings of the image.
Alternate considerations might be 
brought to the eye as a form of play. Derrida’s 
consideration of play as a de-centring of 
meaning within bounds allows critical logics 
to be reconfigured. The new readings al-
low for interpretation to take place through 
experimentation, continuing the suggested 
move from a digital culture that projects its 
meaning. Iteracy and play work together 
with the pharmakon to create new contexts 
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and movements between remedy and poi-
son. Different structures of feeling might be 
viewed as evidence to be interpreted. Our 
readings work to remake meaning within the 
boundaries through combining human and 
machine meanings. Doing this, we begin to 
recontextualise the medium as a site of cog-
nitive practice where readings combine and 
recombine. I want to use reading with ma-
chines to think about critical practice beyond 
the interface and at the level of the medium.
Reading with machines supports 
methodological changes that are hinted at by 
Williams. The element’s existence and its in-
terpretative possibilities as part of an emerg-
ing discourse is problematised through this 
process. The remediation of the images in 
different media suggests that the presented 
evidence is a poisoned reading that is guided 
by the models of presentation. Translating a 
feature into a series of technical languages 
to create a new model and element alters the 
discourse and its specificities. It is only by 
looking for the imperfections in the surfaces 
that we are able to begin a reading that cri-
tiques these discourses. By taking part of the 
presented data, hypotheses can be formulat-
ed and tested. Meaning can be interrogated 
by altering parameters and questions to test 
the new way of thinking and interpretations, 
while recognising that the structures of feel-
ing may be made of other structures. The 
evidence that we are examining for clues is 
made of other evidence and hypotheses that 
is generated from the machine. 
Conclusion
Using Williams’s definition of structures of 
feeling as cultural hypotheses, this paper 
argues that they might be seen models of 
thought that are translated into computational 
models. The evidence is used to generate 
new cultural forms that are returned to the 
evidence that it came from. By understand-
ing these processes as a mix of human and 
machine discourse, we can think about how 
to both interpret and interact with them. 
Iteracy encourages not only a different form 
of reading but also critical engagement with 
the underlying discourse, so considering 
the medium as the site of cognitive practice 
where discourses mix and create interpreta-
tive gaps. The claiming of the computational 
as a metamedium provokes the need for new 
practices of making meaning that consider 
the medium. These theoretical considera-
tions are the subject of ongoing research into 
the digital object as a core concern in distant 
reading methodologies. 
Rather than seeing the digital mediation 
of cultural forms as a machine-driven pro-
cess, I contend that considering them within 
the medium opens up new forms of critical 
interpretation and techniques that use the 
revealed discourse. From this we understand 
that computational structures of feeling be-
come imperfect structures of feeling. 
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[1] Next Rembrandt, 
https://www.nextrembrandt.com/.
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